Disarmament and Disclosure: How Arms Control Verification Can Proceed without Threatening Confidential Business Information

TY - JOUR

T1 - Disarmament and Disclosure: How Arms Control Verification Can Proceed without Threatening Confidential Business Information

AU - Kellman, Barry

AU - Gualtieri, David S.

AU - Tanzman, Edward A.

N1 - Barry Kellman; David S. Gualtieri; Edward A. Tanzman, Disarmament and Disclosure: How Arms Control Verification Can Proceed without Threatening Confidential Business Information, 36 Harv. Int'l. L. J. 71, 126 (1995)

PY - 1995

Y1 - 1995

UR - https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=true&handle=hein.journals/hilj36&div=7&start_page=71&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=42&men_tab=srchresults

M3 - Article

VL - 36

JO - Harvard International Law Journal

JF - Harvard International Law Journal

ER -